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NEUROSECURITY FOR BRAINWARE DEVICES 
 
 
Brian Cusack, Kaushik Sundararajan, Reza Khaleghparast 
Cyber Forensic Research Centre, Auckland University of Technology, Auckland, New Zealand 




Brainware has a long history of development down into the present day where very simple and usable devices are 
available to train for the control of games and services. One of the big areas of application has been in the health 
sciences to provide compensatory control to humans who may lack the usual capabilities. Our concern has been 
the protection of information in brainware so that a human intention may have confidentiality, integrity, and 
accessibility to the required implementation mechanisms for services. The research question was: What are the 
consequences of security failure in brainware? Our research tested a brainware device and found vulnerabilities. 
The most significant vulnerability was the ability to capture and inject communication packets so that a human 
intention could be hijacked. The consequences of this communication failure are for psychological harm to the 
human and unplanned for actions in the material environment. 
Keywords: Security, Failure, Brainware, Hijacking, Harm 
INTRODUCTION 
Electro activity in the human brain has been studied for over a century and various applications devised that 
enhance human capabilities in areas where capability may be deficient. In particular thinking ability and motor 
control have been beneficiaries of brainware devices (Allison, et al., 2007; da Silva, 1996). Significant progress 
has been made from the times when invasive surgical operations were required to insert brainware devices inside 
a human brain to gain the benefits. Today brainware has become nonintrusive and the latest advancements have 
dry electrodes that sit on the human head collecting the electro activity of the brain (Wyecoff, et al., 2015). These 
are significant technological advancements that provide ease of use and ready access for research and learning. 
Some are woven inside baseball caps and other socially integrated headgear, and the device acts as an 
inconspicuous aid for enhanced human capability (Bonaci, et al., 2014; Kroeker, 2011). The headsets are also 
relatively inexpensive and available for purchase online or in gaming and electronics shops. They can be trained 
to control a wide variety of applications including, model cars, wheelchairs and games (Wolpaw et al., 2002). The 
simplest ones have a single electrode and minimal control functions such as up, down, left, and right; which is 
sufficient for a toy or a computer game. Other headsets have 14 and more electrodes and a greatly increased 
capacity to harness a wider variety of emotions in the human brain and to create a more refined control interface. 
The use of brainware is relatively simple once it has been trained (Jeunet, et al., 2016; Donoghue, 2002). The 
training of brainware software is similar to the training of voice activation and transcription software. The user in 
each situation has to go through a series of standardised algorithms that link the human variability to the 
standardised software processes. In brainware that is used for playing a game or controlling a wheelchair, the user 
has to think and not to move or speak. So for example, if I was training my brainware application to steer a remote 
control car, I would have to continue to think the word “left” until the electro activity in my brain mapped onto 
the preprogramed software for turning the car left. Sometimes the matching takes longer than others but providing 
the user is prepared to concentrate and put in the time to train the software, the effects are created by thinking. In 
the radio controlled car situation, once the brain-ware is trained, then it is possible to put on the headset, look at 
the remote control car (power on in car) and control its movement up to approximately 3 meters by using the 
correct thoughts. Similarly, for the training of the control of a wheelchair and other medical applications the user 
has to spend time synchronising their electro brain activity with the application they wish to use, but once 
completed the communication is relatively effective (Millan, et al., 2004).  
A significant problem for human behaviour and human psychological stability arises once the user has trained the 
brainware to perform particular functions. If the application does not behave in the ways that it has been trained 
and the user expectation satisfied, the relationship is destabilised and the effectiveness of the technology 
undermined. There are several ways that this may occur but our specific research interest was in the situation were 
the brainware is hacked and unexpected responses to thoughts are presented to the user (Denning, et al., 2004). In 
this situation many unintended human behaviours may be demonstrated and the purpose of the technological 
advantage lost. Consequently our research took a brainware device and tested it for security vulnerabilities 
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(Martinovic, et al., 2012; Li, et al,. 2015). The results show that the communication between the headset and the 
computer interface or the device has vulnerabilities that disclose information regarding the intended control 
function and the brain to device mapping. We also performed test attacks to disconnect the thought from its 
intended action. In this research our objective was to demonstrate the vulnerabilities in the use of brainware, but 
anecdotally it was obvious the intervention had a negative impact on the user. Our concern is that suitable 
consideration is given to the securing of the communication between the headset and the devices so that the user 
intention is conveyed through to the effect. The implication of disruption in the communication channel is for 
unplanned actions, frustration and potential harm to the user. The consequences may be insignificant when a 
remote control car is being used for fun, but it is a much more serious case when humans are controlling prosthetic 
arms, wheelchairs, and sufficing control effects (Wolpaw, et al., 2002; Kroeker, 2011; Lauer, et al., 2000).  
Other writers have defined Neurosecurity as the protection of neural devices from adversaries trying to exploit, 
block, eavesdrop, or generally disrupt neural signals (da Silver, 1996; Darvis, et al., 2004; Nijholt, et al., 2009). 
Confidentiality is critical in maintaining the privacy of information and it is for the developers to assure that the 
properties of the device cannot be exploited to disclose signals or any other protected information (Lauer, et al., 
2000; Golub, et al., 2016; Li, et al., 2015). Similarly, an attacker should not be able to change device settings or 
initiate unauthorised operations that compromise the integrity of the device and its information. The availability 
of the device for clear and intended communication requires strong security measures. Neuro security is 
consequently the protection of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the neural devices for the intended 
user, in such a way that the safety of a person’s neural mechanisms, neural computation, and free will, are protected 
(Millan, et al., 2004). Our laboratory tests on devices suggest that neural security is lagging in some readily 
available brainware headsets on the market today. 
DEVICE TESTING 
The brain computer interface (BCI) consists of four components and a connecting signal (see figure 1). 
BCI requires a human user who has a sensing device that collects the electro chemical energy 
transmissions from the brain. The sensing device communicate s to a signal processing module that puts 
the sensor signals into a manageable format for transmission either through wired or wireless media. 
The forth component is an application that will drive an effect, such as movement, decisions, control, 




Figure 1. Brain Computer Interface Architecture 
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We chose the Emotiv Insight 5 channel EEG headset for testing. The Emotiv Insight is designed to detect 
performance levels of certain parameters that include the human attention level, focus level, engagement level, 
interest level, relaxation level and stress level. In addition to detecting performance, it also detects mental 
commands and facial expressions. These expressions include blink, wink, frown surprise, clench and smile. All 
these parameters are recorded using a computer based interface called Emotiv Xavier Control Panel. The control 
panel shows signal quality of the brainwear, mental commands, facial expressions, and the inertial sensors. In 
addition to these features, the control panel also provides connectivity to other platforms of Emotiv for information 
conditioning. Once all the five channels are green then training can begin, and once trained the headset can be 
used many times by the same user. 
 
Figure 2. Emotiv Insight 5 channel EEG headset (Emotiv, 2016) 
Previous research has established the vulnerability of devices to disclose critical information when tethering in 
Bluetooth wireless networks (Li, Ding, Conti, 2015). We assumed the vulnerability and only briefly checked the 
matter to confirm the problem and potential violation of confidentiality. However, this research was concerned with 
intervention in the communication between the headset and the device. Could we hijack the headset control and 
substitute alternative commands, unknown to the user; and hence, violate the integrity of the system?  
 
Figure 3. Research Design 
Consequently, the Ubertooth-one and Adafruit sniffers were not capable of manipulating and resending changed 
packets, and hence a framework called ‘Btlejuice’ was deployed. The framework makes use of external Bluetooth 
dongles CSR 4.0, creates a clone of the target device, and intercepts the Bluetooth General Attribute Profile 
(GATT) from the top most layer of the Bluetooth protocol stack. The support software requires setting the target 
device (the headset), and then double clicking the headset icon so that the Bluetooth dongle proxies the services 
and characteristics of the Insight headset and pairs with the headset. The packets are then captured on the proxy 
for manipulation and the system tricked into accepting the proxy communications in a replay attack. Figure 3a 
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shows the normal information flow between the headset and the device and figure 3b how we hijack and replay 
fake messages to alter the device effect. 
RESULTS 
The implementation of the research design was challenging as we had to customise many of the tools used to fit 
the context. Similarly we had to access the Emotive code layer in order to audit the findings. Initially the standard 
Bluetooth sniffing tools functioned as expected and easily compromised the confidentiality of the communication 
between the headset and the device. However, the violation of communication integrity required the 
implementation of the Btlejuice system of hardware and software in order to create replay attacks that changed the 
intended device effects. The headset communication was connected to a proxy client which had the same 
characteristics and services as the Insight headset. On launching the application called Mental Commands, a 
dummy headset is displayed on the proxy, and can be manipulated to recreate any of the headset commands. The 
compromised commands were then sent back to the headset to broadcast to the device. As soon as the proxy 
application connects to the headset, the Btlejuice suite starts to capture all the data sent. The following set of screen 
shots (figures 4 to 9) show the results. 
 
Figure 4. Screenshot of Btlejuice intercepting communication 
 
Figure 5. Screenshot of the application Mental Commands sending commands to the headset 
All the data transmitted by the application on the proxy destined for the Insight headset could be intercepted and 
also had the option to modify the data. This feature known as ‘on the fly modification’ could be performed. 
Initially, any command sent by the headset will be sent to the proxy to confirm whether the data should be 
forwarded to the headset for sending to the device or not. Figure 6 presents a screenshot of the active data 
intercepted with an option to forward the data or simply devoid the headset of that specific data. This intercepted 
data could also be modified with a different command to the headset for a different or unintended function to 
perform. 
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 Figure 6. Screenshot of the active data sent from the proxy application to the headset 
Figure 7 shows specific data captured for command 1800, and the way it may be modified to any other command. 
In this situation 1800 was associated with the device turning left effect. On this screen the turn right command 
180f can be inserted to replace 1800, and the device effect subsequently changed. The lexicon of commands can 
be obtained from the headset or from the support literature. 
 
Figure 7. Screenshot of the modification of commands 
The command change can also be seen in the Btlejuice terminal window in figure 8.  
Proceedings of the 15th Australian Information Security Management Conference 53
 Figure 8. Screenshot of the modified data sent back to the headset 
The images report the feasibility of a data modification attack and a replay attack; to violate the integrity of 
Brianware communication to a device. On further analysis, the nrf Bluetooth application could list both the 
devices, the real Insight headset with the mac address f2:78:4a:15:77:bb along with the fake Insight headset on 
the proxy with the mac address 00:1a:7d:da:71:14.  
 
Figure 9. Screenshot of the nrf Bluetooth application showing the real and the fake control 
The headset is connected to the proxy and the fake application on the smartphone. The fake device has been cloned 
with the same features and characteristics as the original device which fools the application to think that the fake 
device is the real device. Figure 9 presents a screenshot of two Insight headsets with different mac address that 
look identical, including the serial number of the headset. 
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CONCLUSION 
The confidentiality of the headset was easily compromised but the violation of integrity was more 
difficult. We fundamentally structured a man in the middle attack where fake packets were substituted 
for the real ones. The attack progressed in two phases. In the first phase, the p rimary channel of 
communication sent the packets correctly but then the control was switched to a fake proxy. The proxy 
took the correct packets and substituted alternative ones back to the headset, and subsequently the 
communication stream to the device. This meant that the radio controlled car would get one signal that 
would tell it to turn right and then almost immediately another signal to turn left. The consequence was 
that the car would buzz but turn neither left nor right and remained frozen in the c urrent state. The 
second phase of attack was to divert the primary communication channel and to substitute new control 
commands. This meant that if the primary channel had told the car to turn right then we removed the 
control packets and substituted a fake command to turn left. These attacks were successful and the 
remote control car became in control of the secondary information source. The effect demonstrated that 
it is possible to shift the primary control to a secondary source but there is still more research to design 
a sandbox that would quickly process the incoming raw signals and to substitute the fake commands. 
These findings are disturbing and indicate that the accessibility to the communication channel between 
the headset and the device or game, can also be disrupted. A simple denial of service attack can be 
hosted by multiple secondary sources substituting packets into the communication stream. These packets 
could be both meaningless and meaningful in the command and control structures, but eithe r disposition 
would bring disruption to channel access. The implications are for disruption of human intentions and 
unintended actions. 
The consequences of security failure in brainware devices are yet to be documented in sufficient numbers  
and scope, that regulatory requirements are implemented for device performance specifications. We also 
observed that with different brainware headsets that there were no standardised ways of doing a smile 
for example. This is something that the industry might look at in the future so that when a user is training 
a headset then a human characteristic is consistent between the different brands and different algorithms. 
The headsets are also sensitive to underlying emotions and can be used for feedback to the user and not 
just to an external control situation. For example the five electrode headset also reported to the user 
other parameters that included the user attention level, the user focus level, the user engagement level, 
the user interest level, the user relaxation level, and the user stress level. These emotional contexts are 
part of the feature extraction the brainware computes and provides as output. Our concern here is that 
not only is there information with an external control capability, but these headsets are als o linked into 
an information feedback loop to the user. If either of these two information streams is compromised, 
then there are unplanned for consequences arising from the use of the technology.   
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